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Abstract. A common and enduring early modern intuition is that materialists reduce 
organisms in general and human beings in particular to automata. Wasn’t a famous book of 
the time entitled L’Homme-Machine? In fact, the machine is employed as an analogy, and 
there was a specifically materialist form of embodiment, in which the body is not reduced to 
an inanimate machine, but is conceived as an affective, flesh-and-blood entity. We discuss 
how mechanist and vitalist models of organism exist in a more complementary relation than 
hitherto imagined, with conceptions of embodiment resulting from experimental physiology. 
From La Mettrie to Bernard, mechanism, body and embodiment are constantly overlapping, 
modifying and overdetermining one another; embodiment came to be scientifically addressed 
under the successive figures of vie organique and then milieu intérieur, thereby overcoming 
the often lamented divide between scientific image and living experience. 
 
 
1. The Problem of Polysemous Embodiment 
 
In what follows we seek to trace and reconstruct, through a series of examples running from 
the early modern Cartesian context through Enlightenment materialism to mid-nineteenth 
century medicine, a revised concept of embodiment as emerging out of naturalistic, 
mechanism-friendly practices in the life sciences and in theoretical efforts relating to such 
practices. Such an approach runs directly counter to the common understanding in which 
‘embodiment’ (whether it is approached historically or from a contemporary standpoint) is 
precisely what the scientific study of organic life ‘misses’. But what is embodiment? Or more 
precisely, when a concept of embodiment is invoked in, inter alia, scholarship on Descartes or 
Spinoza, early modern ‘cultures of the body’, or the study of embodied cognition (to list some 
examples1) what concept is this, if there is any conceptual unity here at all? Broadly speaking, 
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in the study of cognition, ‘embodied mind’ perspectives reject traditional computational 
approaches and present our cerebral life as necessarily occurring within a body, understood 
both as a dynamic system and as something fundamentally my own in the sense of Merleau-
Ponty’s corps propre: I am not ‘in my body’, on this view, as if I were in a merely material 
container; instead, I sense in a profound way that my body is my own.2 The emphasis here 
usually falls on how an embodied agent inhabits the world, not as one body amongst others 
(atoms and asteroids and bottles) but as a subject in her own environment. In cultural studies, 
embodiment seems to connote a complex relation between historicity and gender, in which 
“subjectivity [is] profoundly experienced as interrelated with the physical, and societal 
changes or structures influenced the ways in which the body was perceived,”3 through 
scientific discourses but also in many other ways.4 Embodiment here is not the facts about our 
biology but, paradoxically, about our historicity: 
There is no clear set of structures, behaviors, events, objects, experiences, 
words, and moments to which body currently refers. Rather, it seems to me, the 
term conjures up two sharply different groups of phenomena. Sometimes body, 
my body, or embodiedness seems to refer to limit or placement, whether 
biological or social. That is, it refers to natural, physical structures (such as 
organ systems or chromosomes), to environment or locatedness, boundary or 
definition, or to role (such as gender, race, class) as constraint. Sometimes-on 
the other hand-it seems to refer precisely to lack of limits, that is, to desire, 
potentiality, fertility, or sensuality/sexuality . . . or to person or identity as 
malleable representation or construct. Thus body can refer to the organs on 
which a physician operates or to the assumptions about race and gender 
implicit in a medical textbook, to the particular trajectory of one person's 
desire or to inheritance patterns and family structures.
5
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The ‘lived body’ we encounter in contemporary embodiment discourse is the body in 
pain, or in a state of enjoyment; in a reflexive, indeed intimate relation to itself – quite 
different, according to embodiment theorists, from the more generic body in space. 
They maintain that the lived body (which is the only relevant sense of the body for 
them) exists at least in part “outside of physical space.”6 Thus the living body – 
indeed, any organism – “is an individual in a sense which is not that of modern 
physics” (ibid., 154). This is often presented in cultural studies as an insight 
countering ‘Cartesianism’. So, Jonathan Sawday, in his otherwise impressive study of 
early modern anatomy, The Body Emblazoned, refers to the rise of a Cartesian 
mechanistic world-picture and states that “As a machine, the body became objectified; 
a focus of intense curiosity, but entirely divorced from the world of the speaking and 
thinking subject.”7 That this is a rather impoverished and historically unfortunate 
portrayal of early modern mechanism is not germane to the present paper, although it 
is worth exploring elsewhere. 
 
We are faced already with one general problem: the gap between discourses of 
embodiment and the complexity of ‘body’ and biological or medical terms as 
understood from the standpoint of the history and philosophy of the life sciences. That 
is, cultural discussions of early modern embodiment usually position themselves 
counter to a kind of ‘mainstream science’, which they present as alienated and 
alienating, as quantitative and reductionist, and of course dehumanizing. The 
quantitative and reductionist part turns out to be partly true but more complicated; the 
rest is at best highly debatable, not least given the importance of reflections on 
‘organism’ and ‘organismic’ approaches at least since the Leibniz-Stahl debate, and 
prominently part of physiological discussions in the era of Claude Bernard.
8
 This 
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complexity can be shown in a variety of cases, ranging from recent reinterpretations of 
Descartes on life, passions and physiology, the role of early modern automata in 
modelling vital processes (and thus creating bridges in between the mechanical and 
the organic), vital materialism understood as a form of materialism specifically 
concerned with body and vitality, and lastly, vitalist models of the ‘animal economy’ 
in the mid-eighteenth century and their combined reprisal and rejection in nineteenth-
century experimental medicine, from Bichat to Bernard. We shall discuss four cases: 
Descartes and medicine (section 2), embodied materialism versus the older concept of 
mechanistic materialism (section 3), and the emergence of organismic yet mechanism-
friendly models in nineteenth-century medicine such as Bichat’s physiology, leading 
up to Claude Bernard’s notion of ‘machine vivante’ (section 4); the status of vitalism, 
including its scientific pertinence, is addressed in sections 3 and 4. 
 
2. Body and Soul in a Medical Context 
 
Contrary to the standard picture of Descartes the substance dualist, whose understanding of 
nature is so purely mechanistic that no particular features of ‘life’ or ‘bodies’ subsist in a non-
reduced form, scholars including Gaukroger, Sutton, Des Chene and differently Shapiro have 
pointed to the presence of functional concepts in Cartesian physiology; of body-soul union (in 
the correspondence with Elizabeth); of a notion of health and consequently normativity 
generated out of the body-machine concept.
9
 This is not to say that Descartes did not 
influentially adopt a deflationary approach to embodiment, or that iatromechanism
10
 should 
be confused with, say, Georg-Ernst Stahl’s focus on the holistic properties of organism and 
the temporal character of disease, as presented for instance in his critique of Leibniz.
11
 As 
concerns Cartesian mechanism as apparently a denial or reduction of embodiment, passages 
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like this one from the Treatise on Man are numerous (as they are in authors such as Borelli, 
Pitcairne, Croome and beyond): (QUOTATION IN PUBLISHED VERSION).
12
 
 
Yet we must summarily make two observations that nuance the picture of the Cartesian body-
machine as merely a ‘machine made of earth’. The first is internal to Descartes’ system and 
concerns the extent to which features as diverse as sensation, self-preservation, health, 
function and perhaps even a ‘life principle’ are – surprisingly – irreducible.13 The second is 
more external and concerns medical mechanism as a whole. 
 
For the ‘body-soul’ problem – arguably the immediate ancestor of the ‘mind-body’ problem, 
inasmuch as it was concerned with possible relations between corporeal states and mental 
processes – was also a medical one. With reference to the Cartesian context alone, entire 
books have been written just on the specifically medical context of Cartesianism.
14
 Both 
during Descartes’ own lifetime and in the following decades, numerous physicians claimed to 
be carrying out a legitimate Cartesian project, e.g., eliminating final causes and explaining all 
of nature mechanically, including the human body, while in fact moving ever closer to an 
integrated view of psychosomatic processes. Thus Henricus Regius, a physician and Professor 
of Theoretical Medicine at the University of Utrecht, often called the ‘first apostle of 
Cartesianism’ (e.g. in a review in the Nouvelles de la république des lettres in October 1686), 
asserted that the soul could be a mode of the body, with the body being understood as a 
machine, and that the human mind, inasmuch as it exists in a body, is organic.
15
 Even Marx 
(borrowing from Renouvier’s history of philosophy) mentioned Regius as a precursor of La 
Mettrie: “Descartes was still alive when Le Roy applied to the human soul the Cartesian idea 
of animal structure, and declared that the soul was but a mode of the body, and ideas were but 
                                                          
12
 AT XI 131; CSM I, 100. Cf. also the passage in the Sixth Meditation on the ‘health’ of a watch: “A clock 
constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its nature just as closely when it is badly made and 
tells the wrong time as when it completely fulfills the wishes of the clockmaker. In the same way, I might 
consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, 
blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still perform all the same movements 
as it now does in those cases where the movement is not under the control of the will or, consequently, of the 
mind” (AT VI, 84; CSM II: 58); thanks to Christoffer Basse Eriksen for discussion on this). 
13
 See Fred Ablondi, “Automata, Living and Non-Living: Descartes’ Mechanical Biology and His Criteria for 
Life,” Biology and Philosophy 13 (1998) and the discussion in Barnaby Hutchins, “Descartes and the dissolution 
of life,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). 
14
 Most recently, Annie Bitbol-Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1990), Vincent 
Aucante, La philosophie médicale de Descartes (Paris: PUF, 2006), and Gideon Manning, “Out on the Limb: 
The Place of Medicine in Descartes’ Philosophy,” Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007) (a useful review 
essay). 
15
 Henricus Regius, Fundamenta physices (Amsterdam: Elzevier, 1646), 248, 246. For more discussion of 
Regius see the excellent analysis in Delphine Bellis, “Empiricism Without Metaphysics: Regius’ Cartesian 
Natural Philosophy,” in Cartesian Empiricisms, eds. M. Dobre and T. Nyden (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
 
6 
mechanical motions.”16 Others asserted that Descartes was too timid, and one should be a 
Cartesian in physiology while eliminating substance dualism, in favour of a parallelism of 
physical events and mental events (Louis de La Forge
17
), or, rather tortuously, tried to argue 
‘from’ Descartes towards a materialist account of mind-body interaction, at times seeking to 
integrate Cartesianism and Epicureanism.
18
 Such thinkers tried to collapse their ideas into 
Descartes’ own, but others – perhaps tellingly, outside of France – were quicker to dispense 
with any monopoly Descartes might have had over the prestige of mechanism in medicine, 
like Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) or Hieronymus Gaub (1705-1780). 
 
Boerhaave’s 1690 doctoral thesis in philosophy at Leiden, where he was later Professor of 
Medicine, Botany, and Chemistry (he was widely viewed as the most influential lecturer in 
medicine in Europe, and taught figures including La Mettrie, Gaub and Haller) was entitled 
De distinctione mentis a corpora, and there he argued for a distinction between mind and 
body. But in his later Praelectiones academicae (1739), he denied any medical or 
physiological pertinence to the distinction between body and soul or mind understood as a 
form of substance dualism (§ 27). Body and mind are united, communicated, mutually affect 
one another, and a change occurring in the one produces a change in the other; this view may 
explain the unfair accusations of Spinozism that were laid against him. Boerhaave admits that 
he has no way of explaining the interaction between body and mind experimentally;
19
 he 
considers three hypotheses, “physical influx,” occasional causes and divine harmony, and opts 
for the last (§ 27.7). He adds a remark that was repeated, with or without attribution, many 
times during this period (similar comments can be found in Galen): physicians should only 
concern themselves with the body, even when dealing with mental illness (or ‘diseases of the 
soul’), for once the body is working correctly, the mind will return to its proper “officium” (§ 
27.8) – the ancient Stoic term for the role we are destined to play, which in this context can be 
rendered as “function.”20  
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Boerhaave’s student Gaub, who took over his Chair in Leiden, gave a lecture in there in 1747 
which La Mettrie claimed to have attended (some months prior to finishing L’Homme-
Machine), entitled De regimine mentis. This text is important for us because there Gaub 
suggests a clinical perspective on the problem of mind-body interaction (for he is speaking of 
mens rather than anima, reflecting a process of naturalization which is underway in this 
period).
21
 La Mettrie spoke favourably about the ideas he heard, and his enthusiasm
22
 makes 
sense, for Gaub had defended the view that for the physician, the metaphysical distinction 
between mind and body is irrelevant. “Although the healing aspect of medicine properly looks 
toward the human body only, rather than the whole man, it does refer to a body closely united 
to a mind and, by virtue of their union, almost continually acting on its companion as well as 
being itself affected in turn.”23 Gaub refers to the authority of Descartes, “the most ingenious 
philosopher of his age,” who “yielded to physicians” regarding the priority of medicine in 
these matters (74)
24
, and states that due to the variability of temperaments, itself explainable 
in humoral (and hence medical) terms, the philosopher “cannot dispense with the aid of the 
physician” where the mind is concerned (86). 
 
So whereas some of the Cartesians, Boerhaave and Gaub thought that the body-soul union (or 
relation, depending on their convictions) fell under the medical purview, but that it was 
perhaps best to focus on the body, others were more aggressively materialist in asserting the 
autonomy of medicine with respect to theology or other disciplines. Thus Boerhaave’s advice 
to physicians (‘only concern yourself with the body’) becomes, in the Montpellier physician 
Ménuret de Chambaud’s entry “Mort” in the Encyclopédie, more radical: 
 
The separation of the soul from the body, a mystery which may be even more 
incomprehensible than its union, is a theological dogma certified by religion, 
and consequently is uncontestable. But it is in no way in agreement with the 
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lights of reason, nor is it based on any medical observation; hence we will not 
mention it in this purely medical article, in which we will restrict ourselves to 
describing the changes of the body, which, as they alone fall under the senses, 
can be grasped by the physicians, those sensual artists, sensuales artifices.
25
 
 
Here the medicalisation is administered in such strong doses that the concept of soul falls out 
altogether.  
 
But these attempts to articulate and justify a specifically medical approach to body-soul 
relations (which will gradually be termed ‘body-mind’ relations by the later eighteenth 
century) can also accept substance dualism, albeit idiosyncratically. William Cullen, in 
physiological lectures given at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh in the mid-
1760s, reflected on substance dualism, not in order to reject it, but to give it a peculiarly 
medical cast. For Cullen, we can know the mechanism(s) governing our bodies, not that 
which governs our minds. Yet, like Boerhaave, he also thinks that our mental states are 
inseparable from “some conditions in the body.”26 But – perhaps on ideological grounds – 
Cullen immediately appealed to the good reputation of Boerhaave and Haller, who were never 
“suspected of Irreligion” (ibid.). However, he also recognises that the mind-body problem 
remains problematic for physicians as well; but the specifically medical version of the 
problem as he states it sounds much like an embodied materialist statement from Diderot or 
La Mettrie, as we shall discuss below: it reduces “the problem of the action of the mind upon 
the body” to the problem: “how one State of the body or of one part can affect another part of 
it” (ibid.). Such reduction is a reduction to states of the body, in accordance with explanations 
of bodily processes; it is not a reduction to some ‘fundamental physics’ or to the properties of 
matter as a whole. 
 
Similar (although not in medical-historical terms) to Cullen’s way of defending substance 
dualism while insisting on a specifically medical variant, the Paris physician Antoine Le 
Camus, in his Médecine de l’esprit (1753), put forth the program that medicine should know 
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both minds and bodies, so that it can perfect the mind by acting on the body. Le Camus notes 
that most people would not deny medicine’s expertise when it comes to the body, but they 
would be reluctant to grant it authority over the mind, and he wants to remedy this situation: 
“to remedy to the vices of the mind is nothing other than to remedy the vices of the body.”27 
Although phrased in terms of Cartesian dualism, Le Camus’ conception of medicine and of 
therapeutics is a different creature, for it belongs to the conceptual scheme of the “animal 
economy” – a more integrated, organisational approach28, as we discuss below. Though his 
title suggests that Le Camus is a sort of Cartesian (since the Cartesian thesis is that passions 
are effects of the mind-body union on the mind), he has a more expansive conception of 
medicine. Similarly, Le Camus gestures initially in a Cartesian direction, saying he knows the 
soul is rational and immortal, but he immediately adds that it is also true that the soul is 
“aided in its operations” by “genuinely mechanical causes.”29 Le Camus’s program for 
medicine holds that it is the science which has equal knowledge of mind and body, and hence 
can treat their “abstract combinations” and their “relations” (commerce). While he still refers 
to these as two substances in his terminology, in practice he gives an integrated account of 
“virtues” and “passions” as being as much part of the body as of the soul.30  
 
3. Mechanistic Materialism or Materialist Embodiment? Vitalist Intimations 
 
The medical outlook here allows for a particular kind of materialism, in which embodiment is 
not reducible to more general claims about how what is real is (a) body. Contrast this more 
integrated sense of ‘the body’ with Hobbes’ “That which is not body is no part of the 
universe,” “there is no motion save of corporeal substance”31 or the assertion that Nature in its 
entirety is a “weave of bodies” (tissure de corps), in an intriguing, then-anonymous work of 
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medical materialism known as the Parity of Life and Death (1714) by the eighteenth-century 
physician and materialist Abraham Gaultier.
32
 Diderot gives a more explicitly reductionist 
cast to the claim that ‘all is body’, when, in a major unpublished work which occupied him 
during the last two decades of his life, the Elements of Physiology, he explains that “the action 
of the soul on the body is the action of one part of the body on another, and the action of the 
body on the soul is again that of one part of the body on another” and, in his marginal 
commentary on Franz Hemsterhuis’ 1772 Lettre sur l’homme, “wherever I read soul I replace 
it with man or animal.”33 Similarly, La Mettrie in his first philosophical work, the Natural 
History of the Soul (1745, later revised under the title Treatise on the Soul), declares that “he 
who wishes to know the properties of the soul must first search for those which manifest 
themselves clearly in the body,” and a few years later, in Man a Machine: “But since all the 
faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the brain and the whole body’s own 
organization that they visibly are nothing but this organization itself — here is a machine bien 
éclairée! (really, a sophisticated machine; CW).”34 
 
That the historian of philosophy concerned with mind-body relations, mechanism and the 
status of the soul in a context of ‘naturalization’ ignores the medical context at her peril, is 
one lesson emerging from the above. The same applies to the specific case of materialism, 
with an additional ‘moral’ regarding its well-known assimilation to the position known as 
‘mechanistic materialism’. For one often hears that proper materialism – that of Hobbes, 
d’Holbach and also, what will become ‘physicalism’ in the twentieth century – reduces all 
causes to physical causes, and all matter to a kind of mechanistically (and by extension 
mathematically) specifiable matter. This view was prominently expressed by a thinker not so 
frequently cited in scholarly contexts, Friedrich Engels, in a statement as rewarding of study 
as it is rife with mistakes: 
The materialism of the past century was predominantly mechanistic, because at 
that time . . . only the science of mechanics . . . had reached any sort of 
completion. . . . For the materialists of the 18
th
 century, man was a machine. 
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This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a 
chemical and organic nature – in which the laws of mechanics are also valid, 
but are pushed into the background by other, higher laws – constitutes the 
specific (and at that time, inevitable) limitation of classical French 
materialism.
35
  
There are two major mistakes here. 
One is the belief that chemistry emerged suddenly in the nineteenth century. On the contrary, 
matter theory, materialism and ‘philosophies of nature’ in the eighteenth century, from Stahl 
to Rouelle and Venel, including individuals attending Rouelle’s lectures at the Jardin du Roi, 
like Diderot who was an active participant for three years in the 1750s, were chemically 
obsessed.36 Diderot’s metaphysics of a universally sensing matter, i.e., his enhanced 
materialism in which sensitivity (sensibilité, typically translated ‘sensibility’) is an irreducible 
property of matter, is laden with chemical concepts and vocabulary, in a usage (not unique to 
him) of the image of the chemical laboratory or the distillation still as a way to describe the 
body: “The animal is the laboratory in which sensitivity shifts from being inert to being 
active.”37 
 
The other mistake is to take the man-machine model so literally, while it is really, primarily, 
an organic model, that is, an organism-centred model.38 Even when La Mettrie uses the 
celebrated mechanistic image of the watch or clock as an analogy for the brain’s capacity to 
think, in the opening paragraphs of L’Homme-Machine, when he states that the question, ‘can 
matter think?’ is tantamount to asking ‘can matter tell time?’, he is not literally saying that 
brains are like clocks, but rather, putting forth a functional analogy between different 
arrangements of matter and their correspondingly different functional properties.39 Again, La 
Mettrie is not asserting that the processes and properties of the specific material organization 
                                                          
35
 Engels, Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (1888), in Marx & Engels, Werke, 
vol. 21 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982), 278; Marx & Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. L.S. 
Feuer (New York: Doubleday / Anchor Books, 1959), 211. 
36
 On chemistry in this context see François Pépin, La Philosophie expérimentale de Diderot et la chimie (Paris: 
Garnier, 2012). Diderot criticized physics for its abstraction and insisted that “it is from chemistry that it learns 
or will learn the real causes” of natural phenomena (Diderot, DPV IX, 209). His lecture notes were first 
published in 1887, and are now available in the standard edition of his works: Cours de chimie de Mr Rouelle 
(1756), in Diderot, DPV IX. Note that this criticism of physics is more or less identical with his criticism of 
mathematics in the name of a kind of irreducible … embodiment: “of all the physical sciences to which one has 
attempted to apply geometry, it appears that there are none in which it penetrates less than in Medicine” 
(Diderot, “Méchanicien,” 221). A variety of kindred spirits such as Buffon, Maupertuis, La Mettrie and Bonnet 
(who rejected materialism as a metaphysics) concurred in denying that the body is something that could be 
mathematized.  
37
 Diderot “Lettre à Duclos,” October 10 1765, Corr., vol. 5, 141. 
38
 Ann Thomson, “Mechanistic Materialism versus Vitalistic Materialism,” in Mécanisme et vitalisme, ed. M. 
Saad, special issue of La Lettre de la Maison française d’Oxford 14 (2001). 
39
 Timo Kaitaro, “‘Man is an admirable machine’ – a dangerous idea?” In M. Saad, ed., Mécanisme et vitalisme, 
special issue of La lettre de la Maison française d’Oxford 14 (2001). 
 
12 
of the brain are the same as the processes and properties of the specific material organization 
of a clock.  
 
But also, Engels can be rebutted by showing that materialism had a more constitutive relation 
to the emerging life sciences and their ontology (as in the case of Diderot’s ‘Spinozism’ 
mentioned below) as well as to vitalism.40 Thinkers such as La Mettrie and Diderot articulated 
their form(s) of materialism, not just in direct dialogue with the emerging and evolving life 
sciences, particularly disciplines such as medicine, physiology and natural history (for 
Diderot: “there are no works I read with more pleasure than medical works”41), but more 
strongly, in such a way that the ontological implications of these sciences have a direct impact 
on the core philosophical commitments. This relation between core materialist commitments 
and new life science developments (here, generation/development rather than medicine) is 
explicit in a particularly fascinating if brief text, Diderot’s article ‘Spinosiste’ in the 
Encyclopédie.42 What is striking in this short article is that so-called ‘modern Spinozists’ are 
presented as agreeing with the basic tenets of a metaphysics of substance and modes, and in 
addition as defenders of the biological theory of epigenesis, according to which the embryo is 
formed by successive addition of layers of material substance, without addition of any purely 
‘informational’ entity as in preformationism. 
 
The relation to vitalism deserves more analysis than can be provided here, not least because in 
this case, it is not one but two major misconceptions that are still common, including in major 
survey works like the Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science: that materialism 
reduces everything to matter and motion, while vitalism has as its basic principle an 
immaterial vital force or principle. The present essay builds on work we have done earlier on 
the eighteenth-century Montpellier vitalists, and nineteenth-century physiology and medicine 
(from Bichat onwards), respectively. 
 
Since our ‘Leitfaden’ in this essay is the non-oppositional relation between machine models 
and embodiment, and thus between mechanistic and organismic explanations (if the latter are 
understood structurally rather than ‘foundationally’, i.e. as attempts to model organizational 
complexity rather than as a strong distinction between a foundational principle of order, unity 
or individuality and the aforementioned complexity), we will simply indicate for now that the 
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 Enc. XV, 474. It is not signed by him but strongly resembles passages in his other works and is included in 
most editions of his complete works. For full discussion of this text see Charles T. Wolfe, “Epigenesis as 
Spinozism in Diderot’s biological project,” in The Life Sciences in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. O. Nachtomy 
and J.E.H. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
13 
case of vitalism, at least in some of its Enlightenment forms, can be shown to be much the 
same. That is, just as the reductionist potential of materialist explanations did not mean a 
denial of embodiment but rather a response to the (simultaneously ontological and 
explanatory) challenge of its existence, similarly, the vitalist insistence on the specific 
organizational complexity of living systems is not an insistence on ontological ‘otherness’ 
with respect to mechanical models. Ménuret de Chambaud, one of the more intriguing of the 
physicians associated with the Montpellier School of Medicine, who are commonly referred 
to today as ‘Montpellier vitalists’, not least since they were the first to use the term and apply 
it to themselves, speaks of the ‘human machine’, playing on classic mechanistic language 
while adding on higher-level, chemical properties: 
 
What is man? Or to avoid any misunderstanding . . . what is the human 
machine? It appears at first sight to be a harmonious composite of various 
springs, each of which is impelled by its own motion but (which) all concur in 
the general motion; a general property especially restricted to organic 
composites, known as irritability and sensibility spreads through all springs, 
animates them, vivifies them and excites their motions. But, modified in each 
organ, it infinitely varies their actions and motions: it leads the various springs 
to tighten against one another, to resist, to press, act and mutually influence 
one another. This reciprocal commixture sustains motions, no action without 
reaction. From this continuous antagonism of actions, life and health result.
43
. 
 
There is a kind of equilibrium here – for if we no longer have an autonomous, immaterial soul 
controlling the motions of a mechanically defined body, a more unified, more immanent  
picture of vital activity is needed. Ménuret observed this quite sharply, in his ambitious and 
programmatic article for the Encyclopédie on the “animal economy”: 
 
This idea that the soul is the efficient cause of phenomena because it is the 
origin (principe) of vital motions is not an undeniable truth. It is true that if our 
body was a brute, inorganic machine, it would necessarily have to be directed 
by some other agent, maintaining and powering its motions. And I do not think 
the errors of the mechanists stem from anything else than the fact that they do 
not hold animals to be living, organized composites.
44
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The human machine or organic machine is thus not literally the same as another ‘brute’ 
machine; but the difference lies neither in a ‘soul’ nor in a ‘vital principle’. Rather, it is one of 
organizational complexity.
45
 These models of biological ‘organization’, including the ‘animal 
economy’, which in many respects is a direct predecessor of the organism concept, as when 
its practitioners oppose it to merely mechanical explanations of the living body (Wolfe and 
Terada, “Animal Economy”), open up a conceptual space which sometimes resembles a kind 
of ‘expanded mechanism’, sometimes a heuristic vitalism which would remain compatible 
with mechanistic accounts of specific lower-level organs and functions (in Bordeu and 
Ménuret de Chambaud notably
46
), in the sense that it would seek to understand higher-level 
functions – from digestion and fevers to sleep and perhaps Life itself – while not losing sight 
of lower-level entities and processes enabling the higher functions. 
 
What then of nineteenth-century medicine in the wake of vitalism and newer, more 
sophisticated mechanistic models?  
 
4. From Bichat to Bernard (Embodiment in Physiology after 1800: The ‘French Connection’) 
 
Late eighteenth-century physiologists inherited from the medicine of the animal economy – 
whether that of Montpellier vitalists, or Scottish and English physiologists like the school of 
Munro and Cullen
47
 – a concern with specifying the proper vital properties likely to support 
the functioning of the ‘machine’ – sensibility, contractility, irritability, elasticity. Some 
carried on experiments on frogs to capture the role of electricity within the nervous system 
(so-called Galvanism). Haller’s milestone textbook, the Principles of Physiology, was very 
influential and his experiments to isolate the properties of sensitivity and irritability
48
 
triggered a trend towards experiments in physiology – even though the scope and use of 
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experimentation and especially vivisection were also critically discussed at the time and 
opposed to the value of observation, as Ménuret did in his “Observation” entry in the 
Encyclopédie.
49
 At the same time, medicine initiated its turn towards clinical medicine, with 
the idea that disease is a (possibly local) alteration of a functional organism rather than a 
“species” which would be instantiated by the diseased body. Bichat’s work, spanning 
medicine and physiology, was elaborated around 1800 at the crossroads of those trends. As 
has been extensively studied, he instituted foundations for anatomo-clinical medicine by 
showing that diseases should ultimately be traced back to the altered tissues,
50
 the basic 
building-bricks of an organism, while his Anatomy (Anatomie générale, 1798; Anatomie 
descriptive, 1802) inventoried the 21 various types of tissue in detail.
51
 His physiology 
undertook, in the wake of Haller, a systematic experimental investigation of the functioning 
and death of the organism’s main organs. We take this physiology as a major locus for 
elaborating an embodiment concept in the life sciences, along the lines described below. 
 
i. The general argument. Making embodiment into an object of experimental science 
Bichat’s physiology put forth three types of principles: a definition of life as the set of 
functions that resist death;
52
 a specification of tissues in terms of their elementary properties 
of sensitivity and contractility in his anatomical works; and a division between what he called 
the two lives, i.e. the organic life and the animal life.
53
 The first life – universal among living 
things – is described as a “relation between the organism and itself,” and the second – proper 
to animals – as its relationship to the external environment. Interestingly, it is a new way of 
conceiving of the traditional distinction between “vital functions” and “animal functions” – 
here, in terms of distinct logical kinds of relationship, namely reflexive or correlational. It is 
here that the notion of embodiment seems to find its way into physiology: organisms include a 
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sort of inner space through which they can be related to themselves.
54
 This basic duplication 
or reflexivity supports the very idea of functionality and functions in Bichat’s physiology. 
 
In other words: what ontologically characterizes the animal are those two “lives” and their 
relations. Within each life, one finds ‘functions’ in the sense of ‘major biological functions’ – 
respiration, digestion, motion, perception. And then, each of these functions is achieved 
through the ‘functions of several organs’ – the eyes see, the stomach decomposes nutriments, 
etc. Those are the functions in a second sense, ‘local functions’, functions that the 
physiologist first tries to identify (“what’s the function of this organ?”) and then, analyze 
(“through which mechanism is this function achieved?”, and more precisely for Bichat, 
“which specific combination of tissues, endowed with their specific properties, is required for 
this function to be carried on?”).55 Functions, in both senses, are the elementary units required 
to analyze and understand the existence of lives and their essential relations. Thus, the 
bipartition of lives defines the territory of functional analysis for physiology, which is 
classically indeed oriented towards functions, while anatomy is oriented towards structures 
and can therefore rely on mere observations. 
 
‘Embodiment’, here, refers first of all to organic life as – in phenomenological terms – what 
differentiates any living body (including plants) from mere bodies – a space of reflexivity so 
to speak; and second, the articulation between organic and animal life, which makes it 
possible for the animal to be an embodied agent behaving in the world. Before examining the 
move from Bichat’s inaugural experimental physiology to Claude Bernard’s ambiguous 
position regarding embodiment and vitalism, it is worth mentioning that the latter’s most 
famous idea, that of the milieu intérieur or “internal environment,” could be seen as an 
additional extension of Bichat’s idea of vie organique. The milieu intérieur, as is well known, 
is the set of liquids (mostly) in which each organ of the organism lies, and which mediates the 
communications between organs, and, above all, between each organ and the external 
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environment.
56
 The conceptual divide between an external and an internal “milieu” allows 
Bernard to account for the fact that organisms are not directly determined by changes in their 
milieu – e.g. their temperature does not covary with external temperature; their glucose rate is 
not immediately affected by glucose intake from the external environment etc. – without 
giving up on general determinism, that is, the idea that in a given set of conditions, the same 
effect will always happen. The exact mechanism (in Bernardian terms, le déterminisme) that 
governs animal functioning and behavior is not a strict relation between organism and the 
external milieu, but a double relationship, between organs and their milieu intérieur, and then 
between this milieu intérieur and the external environment. To this extent, the state variables 
that describe the trajectories of each organ are not directly affected by the modification of 
environmental variables, that is, the milieu intérieur somehow buffers them against external 
extreme and rapid changes likely to be met by the organism. 
 
Claude Bernard’s milieu intérieur can then easily be understood as an operationalizable way 
to understand what Bichat called the “lives” of the animal: it is the medium of the relation 
between the animal and itself, which Bichat termed “vie organique.” In this sense, the “milieu 
intérieur” can be seen as a figure of animal embodiment, inherited from Bichat’s 
physiological bipartitioning of lives, which can be can be analyzed regarding its composition 
and potential alteration as a specified mix of liquids, and thus addressed by the tools of 
chemistry (toxicological analysis, etc.), which is the way through which Bernard intends to 
make experimental physiology more rigorously scientific, and therefore overcome vitalism.
57
  
 
ii. Embodiment in experimental physiology, from Bichat to Bernard – or how 
determinism and vitalism come into play 
It is impossible to account for this conceptual history without highlighting the fact that 
Bichat’s concepts in anatomy – e.g. tissue (Anatomie générale) - and physiology (Recherches 
physiologiques) – the two “lives” – were systematically related, and both were embedded in a 
specific physiological experimental device for producing knowledge. Bichat was clearly a 
vitalist, in the sense that he acknowledged a principled opposition between living and brute 
matter, and insisted on the fact that living matter could not display the same regularity and 
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generality that characterizes brute matter.
58
 Epistemologically, this means that whereas 
physicists unveil laws of nature, under the form of what philosophers would now call a set of 
general counterfactual-supporting statements, physiologists can neither access robust 
counterfactuals such as: “if organism A were heated it would do such and such,” nor claim 
general statements such as “swans like to eat eels.” The former impossibility Bichat terms the 
plasticity of the living: answers to stimulation are variable,
59
 the latter is the “idiosyncrasy” of 
the living.
60
 This conceptual opposition is neatly stated in physiology under the form of a 
famous metaphysical opposition: “la vie c’est l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la 
mort” that cannot but remind us of Stahl’s Theoria medica vera, in which chemical forces 
conspire towards the death of living animated bodies. However, elsewhere Bichat curiously 
acknowledges that this quite classical formulation of the singularity of life is somehow 
contingent and hinges upon the historical sequence of the invention of scientific theories: had 
humans invented physiology and not physics first, he said, instead of talking of forces and 
weight when we try to understand the living they would talk in terms of pulses, sympathies, 
secretions, etc., when they would describe motions of bodies, flowing of rivers, etc.
61
  
 
The second part of Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, “Recherches sur la mort,” 
is crucial in the articulation between physiology and anatomy because it somehow legitimizes 
the scientificity of physiology, even though one should acknowledge the strong vitalism to 
which Bichat was committed, as indicated by his ideas about plasticity and idiosyncrasy. We 
will not enter into the details of this epistemological structure.
62
 Suffice to say that in this 
work Bichat investigates the way each of the three major organs (in the physiological tradition 
he inherits), namely brain, lung and heart, conditions the death of the two others: how does 
the death of the brain cause the death of the lungs? Is it direct or happening through the death 
of the heart? etc. Each question is answered by the construction of a sophisticated device that 
neutralizes one organ in an organism slowly enough to make manifest all the downstream 
effects. To this extent, what these physiological researches about death show are the sets of 
necessities required to sustain life in a healthy organism. Even though life is plastic and 
idiosyncratic, so that no gathering of observations would let us know anything about life in 
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general and its manifestations – we can still, through these experimental devices, understand 
which set of necessary conditionings yields in general all the various manifestations of 
physiological functioning and therefore life.  
 
Especially, one important object for Bichat in this framework of study is constituted by the 
relationship between the two lives – since the brain is the major organ for the vie animale and 
the heart is the crucial organ for the vie organique. Therefore, the physiological apparatus that 
explores the sets of necessary conditionings proper to sustain life – conditionings which 
involve primarily the heart and the brain - is capable of showing us how the two lives relate to 
one another.  
 
We earlier hypothesized that Bichat grasped embodiment as vie organique, conceptualized it 
in the complex structure of knowledge that articulates vie organique and vie animale, and then 
related both of them into a rich anatomical structure implementing them and decomposable at 
the level of tissues rather than organs. If this hypothesis is correct, we also understand now 
that a new path taken by the history of embodiment in the nineteenth century goes through the 
novel structure of physiology that Bichat elaborated, which centred around the figure of the 
dying animal, whose death is monitored and grasped by complex experimental apparatuses.  
 
As indicated, the next step in this sketch of a history of ‘clinical embodiment’ was taken by 
Claude Bernard. But before that, however, it is important to consider the work of Bichat’s 
major disciple, who was the teacher of Claude Bernard (a préparateur for his lectures from 
1841 on): François Magendie, himself a famous physician and physiologist at the College de 
France (1831-1855), even though the fame of his disciple finally eclipsed his own. Magendie 
indeed pursued Bichat’s project of establishing experimental physiology as a science, as it is 
clear from reading his Précis élémentaire de physiologie (1816-17). However, in 
contemporary terms one could say that deflationism and minimalism were crucial in his 
approach, in medicine as well as in physiology.  
 
Magendie was a supporter of what is called “expectant medicine”, which means the 
preference for not intervening on a diseased patient, and letting nature naturally bring 
recovery. This attitude stems from two ideas, one which concerns philosophy of nature and 
consists in an Aristotelian or Hippocratic confidence in the healing power of nature itself, the 
other, an epistemic skepticism regarding all human ways of intervening in the complex 
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working of pathological conditions. Here the old slogan “primum non nocere” is pushed to its 
limits: since any intervention is potentially harmful, and we subscribe to a principle of not 
being harmful, it’s better not to intervene at all. 
 
In physiology too, Magendie was somehow deflationist –he was precisely deflating Bichat’s 
vitalism, in a very interesting way. For Magendie, the idea that unknown forces lead 
organisms and organismic tissues to behave in an unpredictable, plastic and idiosyncratic way 
is absurd: since these forces are unknown, we cannot even ascribe these properties to them. 
There is a roman of the vital properties which basically is “the philosophers’ 
anthropomorphism applied to molecules.”63 It is therefore more rational to say that we don’t 
know anything about the substance of what behaves in physiological and biological ways, and 
be content with describing these behaviors as well as all the regularities we can observe, then 
relate them to chemical and physical regularities involved in them, that our physiological 
devices can make manifest. Science is about detecting regular correlations rather than 
unraveling hidden natures: paradigmatically, the glory of Newton does not consist in having 
“discovered attraction,” but in having “established that it acts as a direct function of the mass, 
and inverse of the squared distance.”64 
 
Figure 1. Magendie – classification of bodies – distinction between “corps bruts” and 
“corps vivants”. (see published version)  
 
Magendie therefore gives up Bichat’s commitment to a metaphysical opposition between the 
living and the non-living; according to him, this statement would go far beyond what our 
observations and experiments allow us to claim. Nothing authorizes us to make any principled 
differences between the metaphysical forces that support physiological properties and 
behaviors, and the physical forces that explain the natural phenomena investigated by 
physicists. Actually, the apparent irregularities, variations and unpredictability that we see in 
the case of physiology and pathology could perfectly be ascribed to a lack of understanding, 
observation and information on our part, with no need to attribute these properties to the 
natural forces themselves. We can only hope that progress in our observations and 
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experiments will ultimately bridge the gap between the degree of completeness of our 
knowledge in physics, and the current state of physiology. 
Magendie’s skepticism as such is not especially telling for the history of embodiment. In this 
regard, one could even argue that whereas Bichat’s vitalism allowed him to conceptualize the 
two lives and make “embodiment” into a concept which can be encompassed in the project of 
an experimental physiology, Magendie’s denial of vitalism, epistemological skepticism, and 
almost phenomenalist philosophy of scientific method
65
 is just extraneous to the history of the 
avatars of embodiment. However, this skepticism plays an important logical role in our story, 
because it provides the grounds on which Claude Bernard will elaborate some of its most 
crucial concepts, including the elements of a theory of milieu intérieur, in various general 
publications, from the Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale (1855) to the 
Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux végétaux et aux animaux, the published 
version of his lectures at the Collège de France in 1873. 
Magendie was not exactly a pure behaviorist or phenomenalist. He admits some “forces” that 
are involved in living phenomena, and that are manifested each time a biological phenomenon 
occurs, since he acknowledges that there may be an unknown force acting within living 
bodies (see Fig 1). However, he refuses, against what he sees as vitalism, to ascribe to them 
some distinct properties (such as plasticity etc.) that would make them proper to the living 
realm, i.e., treating them as ontological entities that instantiate a specific and independent 
ontological realm. Instead, he conceives of these forces as pure unknown references or 
designations that we make in specific contexts of scientific descriptions. We just label “vital 
force,” he says, “an unknown cause of the phenomenon of life.” We have to recognize these 
forces, because they are supporting the constant connections between phenomena that we can 
identify through experiments and observations, and because we need them to turn the mere 
establishment of connections into useful relationships of causality.  
Actually, even though he applies Bichat’s ideal of experimental physiology, Magendie’s 
metaphysical views are not so far from Barthez’s vitalism, in which a vital “principle” was 
understood as a sort of unknown, and physiology is an effort to grasp the systematic 
manifestations of this principle through organized machines. Therefore, Magendie could be 
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 “All phenomena of life can be traced back to nutrition and vital action ultimately; but the hidden motions 
constituting those two phenomena being out of scope of our senses, it’s not to them that we should pay attention: 
we limit ourselves to studying their results, that is in the physical properties of the organs, and search for the 
content with the physical properties of the organs, and search for the way the ones and the others concur to the 
general life” (Précis, 37).  
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seen as a vitalist in the sense of those embodied vitalist thinkers, or “materialist vitalists” 
discussed in section 3, rather than in the sense of Bichat, whose vitalism is more exclusive 
vis-à-vis ordinary materialism. Yet, one needs just one more step to definitively get rid of 
these vital forces and the meager commitments to vitalism that could therefore be found in 
Magendie’s writings, notwithstanding his own wording.  
Claude Bernard’s idea of “determinism” – as it is explicated carefully in his two books on the 
methodology of experimental physiology or medicine
66
 – takes this step. Since what 
physiology establishes is in many cases a regular succession of physiological events, such as 
for example, the secretion of sugar when the liver is left alone, or the neutralization of the 
parasympathetic nervous system when curare touches it, it is unnecessary to stipulate an 
unknown force which, so to say, makes this connection. What exists is this mere connection, 
whose existence has to be attested and demonstrated through careful and methodical 
investigation. Physiology aims at unraveling all these connections. These are what we now 
call the mechanisms implementing some specific functions: for instance, the mechanism of 
the gluconeogenic function of the liver, that allows animals to produce their own glucose and 
therefore not rely on consuming plants to gather one of the crucial constituents they need 
(glucose). Experimental physiology thereby does two things: identifying functions – e.g. the 
gluconeogenic function etc. – and finding the mechanisms that implement such functions. 
A Bernardian function is actually a more fine-grained instantiation of the sets of necessary 
conditioning that Bichat intended to explicate through his researches sur la mort. A 
mechanism implementing a function is often established through the same method Bichat 
systematically elaborated: disturbing or killing some of the tissue putatively involved in the 
realization of the function, identifying the subsequent effects of the intervention, and finally 
summing up this information about the effects of the controlled disturbances and 
reconstituting the mechanism.
67
 
Bernard calls “a determinism” the “mechanism” that the research unravels. This 
“determinism” should not be confused with another meaning of determinism, which is 
nevertheless bound to it – namely, the metaphysical principle of determinism, stating that any 
effect produced in a given set of circumstances, will reoccur once the same set of 
circumstance is reactivated. This principle, obviously not falsifiable – since any putative 
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 See Jean Gayon, “Déterminisme génétique, déterminisme bernardien, déterminisme laplacien,” in Le hasard 
au cœur de la cellule. Probabilités, déterminisme, génétique, ed. J.-J. Kupiec (Paris: Editions Syllepse, 2009), on 
Bernadian and Laplacian determinism. 
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 Grmek, Raisonnement toxicologique. 
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falsification could in fact be traced back to a fine-grained undetected break-up of the identity 
of conditions – is necessary for science to be possible, and especially, for any experimental 
physiology
68
 – the science which was modeled by Bichat’s devices of animal 
experimentation.  
According to this viewpoint, no vital forces of any kind are therefore necessary to account for 
the regular and necessary connections established by experimental physiology. “Vital 
phenomena are not manifestations of a free and independent principle. One cannot grasp this 
inner living principle, isolate it and act on it. On the contrary one sees vital acts having 
constantly as conditions some external physico-chemical circumstances, perfectly determined 
and capable of hindering or allowing their appearance.”69 Bernard’s determinism succeeds in 
getting rid of Magendie’s deflated vitalism. Interestingly, the arguably metaphysical principle 
of general determinism – and its connection to the idea of “le déterminisme de,” as a target of 
experimental research – permits the elimination of this other metaphysical idea – the 
“unknown forces” or the vital forces – that a whole tradition of physiologists postulated, from 
Bordeu to Magendie, through Barthez or Bichat. Moreover Bernard does not hesitate to 
explicitly reject Bichat’s famous dualistic and conflict-centered definition of life: “Science, 
one must say, has debunked this definition, according to which there would be two kinds of 
properties within living bodies: physical properties, and vital properties, constantly fighting, 
and tending to predominate the ones over the others.”70  
Such is the logic governing the construction of the concept of “milieu intérieur.” Organisms 
seem to be plastic and idiosyncratic, as Bichat initially recalled; however, no vital forces 
govern them. There are just sets of determinisms to be investigated. What is therefore the 
reason for the seemingly unconnectedness between environmental events such as cold, 
increase in temperature, etc., and the organismic behavior – an unconnectedness that seems to 
challenge the idea of a general and predictable (nomothetic) connectedness between all events 
and things in physical nature? This “unconnectedness” would, in our terms, relate to the 
acknowledgement of this “embodiment” which is the focus of our story. And it can be 
accounted for in terms of a specific kind of determinism, which would explain the apparent 
disconnection by mediating the relation between the organs of the organisms and the external 
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 Bernard, Introduction. 
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 Claude Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux, tome II (Paris: 
Germer Baillière, 1879).  
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 Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes communs. 
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environment. What Claude Bernard achieves here is a way of allowing for a scientific 
conceptualization of embodiment. 
To put it bluntly, the “milieu intérieur” is a privileged object for Bernardian physiology – but 
it is also a tool, because any modification of the organism that can be controlled and 
measured, in order to understand an organism’s proper patterns of causality, should either 
initially modify some parameters of this milieu, or influence its composition. More generally, 
experimental physiology uses the tools of toxicology in order to show how the tiny alterations 
of some liquids constituting the milieu intérieur entail major disturbances of some organs – or 
how perturbations of these organs (e.g. the curare neutralizing neurotransmission in the 
parasympathetic nervous system) are diffracted through various layers of the milieu intérieur. 
Embodiment therefore appears as epistemologically crucial in the deterministic science of 
living things. This would be the last twist given to the idea of embodiment, once it took the 
path of experimental physiology, under the mode of a vie organique as understood by Bichat.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Common perceptions of early modern mechanism, of Enlightenment materialism, and of the 
genesis of nineteenth-century experimental medicine (and biochemistry) all share a tacit, 
sometimes explicit supposition that these must rule out the richness, the experiential texture, 
the significance of ‘embodiment’. Thus Ian Hacking recently spoke in rather mournful tones 
of our current “Cartesian bodies”: no longer machines governed by immaterial souls, but 
nevertheless fully mechanical assemblages of replaceable parts, whether prostheses or 
artificially grown biological parts.
71
 Similarly, Terry Eagleton warned that the body of 
embodiment discourse was quite remote from biology – “the plastic, remouldable, socially 
constructed body, not the piece of matter that sickens and dies.”72 But if Descartes already 
warned (thus defusing one giant phenomenological objection against him in advance) that we 
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 Hacking, “The Cartesian Body.” Notice that an entire mini-generation of prominent Descartes scholars has 
rejected this reading, emphasizing instead an ‘embodied Descartes’, as we noted in Section 2. But that doesn’t 
affect the prevalence of our common concept of the ‘Cartesian body’, often associated with a ‘scientific’ image 
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72
 “Postmodernism is obsessed by the body and terrified of biology. The body is a wildly popular topic in US 
cultural studies – but this is the plastic, remouldable, socially constructed body, not the piece of matter that 
sickens and dies. The creature who emerges from postmodern thought is centreless, hedonistic, self-inventing, 
ceaselessly adaptive. He sounds more like a Los Angeles media executive than an Indonesian fisherman” (Terry 
Eagleton, After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 186). 
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should not conceive of the mind in the body like a sailor (or pilot) in a ship
73
, and if from 
some moments in Cartesian physiology, La Mettrie and eighteenth-century vitalist medicine 
onto Claude Bernard, we are faced with different rearrangements of the conceptual landscape 
in which mechanism, body and the concept we here term ‘embodiment’ are constantly 
overlapping, modifying and overdetermining one another, the status of embodiment in 
relation to life science requires some fresh consideration. 
 
Where certain discussions of embodiment tend to emphasize its cultural embeddedness or its 
presence in literary texts of the period at the expense of so-called scientific works, we would 
instead point to the series of ‘negotiations’ or displacements in which, from early modern 
automata to scientific physiology in the nineteenth century, and in theoretical constellations 
we could term ‘vitalism’ but also ‘vital materialism’, the idea of “organism as individuality” 
(as Bernard put it), of the body-machine as necessarily my own, given that it is an affective, 
desiring, hedonistic entity,
74
 come to the fore.  
 
Among these negotiations, we insisted on the last one, that culminated with Claude Bernard’s 
idea of physiology – wherein the milieu intérieur appeared not only as a crucial concept, but 
also as an organising principle. Now, assuming that embodiment of the living is at least partly 
about the way living beings can relate to themselves in a way which mediates their relation to 
their environment and ultimately specifies their specific patterns of behavior, the construction 
of the concept of milieu intérieur, together with its embedding within a specific experimental 
set of practices inaugurated by Bichat’s Recherches physiologiques, is a crucial moment in the 
history of embodiment: it becomes the correlate of an operational scientific practice. Bernard 
inherits some of the strictures Bichat imposed onto physiological knowledge: pervasiveness of 
an apparatus that displays, through the making of regular sequences of dying (and here, 
Bernard replaces Bichat’s mechanical death with mostly chemical ways of killing organisms 
or organs, via toxic substances), the essential organic relationships of causality or 
conditioning. 
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 It is not sufficient for [the rational soul] to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship . . . but 
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Now, whereas Bichat understood embodiment under the mode of a specific life and tied it to a 
vitalism that accepts contingent and unpredictable changes of regime – which oppose any 
nomothetic understanding and possibly scientificity – Claude Bernard invests the Bichatian 
structures of physiological knowledge into a “milieu intérieur,” which is less directly laden 
with the idea of “life” and the notion of vitalism, and which allows for determinism and 
scientific manipulation.
75
 In concluding the last section, we pinpointed a logical link between 
giving up the notion of vital forces – even the deflationary forces postulated by Magendie –, 
elaborating the idea of determinism and the many determinisms as objects of experimental 
knowledge in physiology, and finally, elaborating the notion of “milieu intérieur” as a set of 
determinisms that mediate between organs (on which physiology either intervenes, or notices 
the effects of interventions) and physical and chemical variables describing the environment. 
This logic supported the constitution of perhaps the last figure of “embodiment,” taken in the 
context of the story of its progressive acculturation within a physiology that progressively 
turned into “experimental physiology” during the nineteenth century. 
 
From Cartesian mechanism and automata (a case not discussed here) as engagements with the 
organizational complexities of living being, through a kind of historico-scientific dialectic of 
materialism and vitalism in philosophy, medicine and physiology in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, we arrived at Bichat, Magendie, and Claude Bernard. Rather than a 
linear progression from ‘blind mechanism’ to the complexities of embodiment, with the 
discovery of the milieu intérieur, we are faced instead with a perpetual elaboration of 
mechanisms or organizational wholes in which a ‘vitalistic’ component is never entirely 
eliminated, nor entirely acknowledged. As Bernard puts it, “The final component of the 
phenomenon is physical, but the arrangement is vital.”76 Or, in La Mettrie’s terms, “That the 
mind possesses such a corporeal nature need not be feared as a blow to our self-esteem.”77  
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 Bernard spoke of "le vrai vitalisme de B(ichat)" in his Carnet de notes – an expression he crossed out. The 
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